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FOREWORD 
This "Information Service" has been initiated and established 
by the Chief of Naval Personnel for the benefit of officers unable to 
attend the Naval War College. 
Articles selected for publication are considered to be of value 
to all officers. However, their publication should not be considered 
as reflecting the opinion of the Naval War ColJege. 
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THE RISE OF SOVIET POWER 
A lecture delivered by 
Professor Michael Karpovich 
at the Naval War College 
October 15, 1948 
The rise of Soviet power in Russia is not mei:ely an historical 
question. As I see it, the circumstances under which the Soviet pow­
er appeared in Russia have a very direct bearing on the difficulties 
that we are . experiencing today in our relations with the repre­
sentatives of that government. I think that, unless you know some­
thing about the nature of the regime, its aims, its spirit, its tech­
nique, you cannot solve the so-called riddle of Russia which perhaps 
would not have been a riddle had the outside world kept itself in".' 
formed about this regime. 
That brings me to the consideration of the revolution of 
1917. What I shall try to do is answer this specific question: 
"Why was there a revolution in Russia? How did it come about? 
And why, in this revolution, did the extreme leftists, as repre­
sented by the Bolshevik (the present day Communists) come out on 
top?" 
First of all let me refer to a rather widespread opinion that 
in order to have a revolution in any country you must have a 
situation of com:plete impasse. Things go from bad to worse and 
finally they become so unbearable that the people rise in revolution. 
I do not think that historic�! records substantiate this point of 
view. As a matter of fact, I think one might almost advance another 
proposition, and that is that revolutions usually happen at a time, 
when there is sufficient improvement in conditions inside of the 
Professor Karpovich was born in Russia and was graduated 
from the University of Moscow. He arrived in this country in June 
of 1917 with the diplomatic mission of the Russian Provisional Govern­
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country. A people that is completely down-trodden, and in completely 
abject misery, usually is not in the spirit of revolution. 
Take the French revolution at the end of the 18th century 
as an example. I think the concensus of opinions of the modern 
historians is that in many respects France was the most advanced 
country on the continent at the time. The position of various groups 
of population, including the intelligensia, was relatively better than 
the position of similar groups .in other countries. It was because 
there had been a partial improvement, and they tasted this improve­
ment, that they wanted more and felt strong enough to insist on 
getting it. Paradoxical as it might sound, I think it is true. It is not 
realized widely that the history of Russia concerns this point of 
view. 
On the basis of my historical study, and my personal im­
pression and recollection, 1 can say that, in the days before the 
revolution, Russia was a rapidly progressive country. Progress was 
going on practically in every direction. Politically it was no longer 
an autocracy because in 1906, a rather modest constitutional regime, 
but still a constitutional regime, was introduced. A national as­
sembly, elected by the people, which was given the name of Duma, 
(an old Russian word for assembly) was invoked. From that time 
on, strictly speaking, Russia was no longer an autocracy, no longer 
a limited royal power, because here was an elected legislative as­
sembly, and without the consent of this assembly no new law would 
become a law. 
Simultaneously, a bill of civil liberties was introduced. 
Everything is relative in this world of ours and certainly it was not 
the same degree of civil liberties that we enjoy in this country to­
day. Many people will tell you that we do not enjoy complete civil 
liberties either, but by comparison I think we have a fair degree 
of them. By comparison with what preceded the constitutional re-
2 
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gime in Russia, it was a very, very considerable advancement. I 
still vividly remember the acceleration of intellectuals and other 
groups of people in the country that now they could speak and 
write and assemble much more freely than it ever had been possible 
before 1906. 
By comparison with what followed, the degrees of civil lib­
erties attained at that time, look rather favorable now also. Certain­
ly there was much more civil freedom in Russia between 1906 and 
1917 than there has been under any of the so-called totalitarian 
regimes in our own days. From this point of view we should not be 
too proud of the period in which we are living. In manr respects it 
is a period of reaction and retrogression, not only in Russia but 
all over the European countries. 
On the economic side it was also a period of progress. In­
dustrialization in Russia did not begin with the revolution. The 
five year plan was another chapter in Russia's industrialization that 
had been going on before the revolution. The period immediately 
before the revolution was one of intense industrialization, very in­
tense in construction among other things. There was an advance 
also in the status, the living standards or the well-being of the 
worker class. Better labor legislation was passed. Trade unions were 
legalized for the first time in Russian history. Until 1905 there 
were no trade unions in existence but they were made legal by 
supreme legislation at this time. It could be proven statistically if 
I had time for statistics, and if I had the papers with me, that 
there was a natural improvement in the living standards of the 
workers at that time, not only in nominal wages but in real wages. 
The overwhelming majority of the Russian population at 
that time however, did not consist of the industrial workers, of 
whom there were no more than three million people out of a total 
population of one hundred seventy million or so. The overwhelming 
3 
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majority of people were peasants, and the plight of the peasants 
was perhaps the most crucial problem in the economic and social 
life of Imperial Russia. There was improvement along these lines 
too. New governmental legislation actually tried to do something 
to alleviate this plight, and I must say, in a rather energetic 
fashion. There was a special peasant land bank established which 
became very vigorous at that time in trying to help the peasants 
who had not enough land to prosper or even to make both ends 
meet. Governmental credit was available to buy land for this 
purpose
'. 
Another remedy was to sponsor migration of peasants from 
the congested rural districts of European Russia to Asiatic Russia, 
in particnlar to the central belt of Siberia. Contrary to the gen­
eral opinion that Siberia was a terrible place, fit only for convicts, it 
is quite a desirable and inhabitable part of the world. The central 
part of Siberia does not differ much from our own northwestern 
agricultural states or from parts of Canada. Of course in the up­
per north is the Arctic region and in the south is the desert, but 
in the central region there was plenty of . room for agricultural 
progress. And the government at the time made a definite effort 
to sponsor migration and entice settlers there to relieve the dreary 
over-population in the center of Russia. Agricultural experts, both 
governmental and private were available in increasing numbers for 
helping the peasant to improve his agricultural technique. Above 
everything else, progressive legislation was introduced which 
tended to substitute individual farming of our American type for 
the rather antiquated village commune system under which many 
Russian peasants still were living, and which in the opinion of 
many economists (and I agree with this opinion) was a hindrance 
to agricultural progress and to the improvement of agricultural 
technique. 








this I mean primarily education. Primary education in Russia was 
lagging behind. There were some secondary schools and universities 
throughout the 19th century, but since the early 20th century a 
very real progress was made in this direction. This was the period 
when Russia really began to overcome illiteracy and this was a:n­
other very important line of progress during this period immediate­
ly before the revolution. 
Now I hasten to say that, with all this progress, there still 
were many elements of instability in Russian life. If there had been 
no elements of instability probably the revolution would not have 
happened. So it was not an historical accident; there was a possibil­
ity, a probability perhaps, for the revolution to take place because 
of these elements of instability. These elements of instability were 
there due to the simple fact that progress was still very recent and 
still was in its initial stages. One could not overcome, in ten years 
or even in twenty years, various drawbacks which were the results 
of centuries of historical development. So, all along the line, this 
tension still continued. 
Political conflict between the government and the opposition 
continued even after the establishment of the constitutional regime. 
The opposition was not satisfied by the constitution of 1906 which 
was won by the revolutionary movement of 1905. This Duma, this 
representative assembly,, was far from being a fully democratic 
assembly. It was based on a limited franchise for property owning 
classes and did not represent the peasants and the workers and even 
the lower middle class to an equal degree. It was also limited in its 
power, in its functions with regard to the government. It was, as I 
told you, a real legislative assembly but it had no complete control 
over finances, over the budget. Everyone who has studied the history 
of representative institutions in world history knows that the con:. 
trol of the purse is one of the most important weapons in the hands 
of such an institution. That power was not given to the Duma, it had 
5 
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no legal control whatsoever over the executive. It might exercise 
moral pressure, but all the legal executive �uthority remained in 
the hands of the Emperor. All the Ministers of State were appointed 
by him and were responsible only to him. No matter what the 
representative assembly thought of this or that executive policy, 
it could do nothing but protest, complain, or try to exercise moral 
pressure; it had no real control over the executive. Becam�e of this, 
the opposition was not satisfied and political tension continued. 
Here I think I should tell you very briefly of what principal 
groups the political opposition consisted on the eve of the Revolu­
tion of 1917. Going from right to left, I shall mention first what 
might be described as the moderate, non-revolutionary, non-socialist 
opposition. The Marxist writers, the Soviet writers, would call it the 
bourgeois parties. These were constitutional democrats. That is, 
they were prepared to cooperate with the monarchy provided it 
would become something like the British or constitutional type. 
They wanted to transform the constitu,tional regime in Russia into 
a really democratic constitutional regime with universal suffrage, 
among other things. They wanted a parliamentary regime in the 
English sense, in which the executive would be responsible to the 
legislature. They wanted to achieve these ends, as well as some 
social reforms, within the framework of the capitalistic society by 
peaceful, constitutional means. In other words, they were revolu­
tionists but they were not preaching revolution, although they 
were bitterly and frankly criticizing and attacking the government. 
More to the left stood the other so-called moderate socialists. 
I say so-called because in any other country they would not be 
considered moderates at all. They went pretty far in their demands 
but as compared with those who were still more to the left they 
were moderates in a relative sense. These moderate socialists did not 
want the monarchy at all. They wanted the Tsarist government, 
the dynasty, overthrown and a republic established-a democratic 
,6 
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republic of the western type, let us say of the American type; they 
also wanted much more radical social reforms than the consti­
tutional democrats were prepared to offer. But these moderate 
socialists were not thinking at the time (I am speaking of the period 
immediately before 1917) of an immediate transition to socialism, 
and here lay the fundamental difference between them and those 
more to the left. They did not contemplate an immediate 
transition to socialism because they argued, and I think with a 
great degree of plausibility, that a country like Russia was not 
prepared for socialism, either on the economic side or on the cul­
tural or psychological side. To this group of moderate socialists be­
long two parties-the so-called Mensheviks, who were a faction of 
the same social democratic party to which the Bolsheviks belong, 
and another party which had the terrifying name of Socialist 
Revolutionaries, but which in reality was not as revolutionary as 
the name implies. 
Finally I arrive at the last group which eventually triumphed 
in the revolution, and these were the Bolsheviks, the left wing of 
the social democrats, who were already at that time under the leader­
ship of Lenin. They wanted destruction of Tsarism by violent 
revolutionary means and then they were prepared to go over almost 
immediately, if circ.umstances permitted, to the introduction of a 
socialist regime. This idea, that one could pass immediately from the 
destruction of the Tsarist government to the introduction of a com­
plete socialist society, developed in Lenin's mind gradually. I think 
that it was not until 1917 that he finally came to that conclusion 
and saw his chance. 
Tension also continued in the field of social :relations because 
no matter how substantial the progress achieved was, it still was 
not substantial enough to dispel the social discontent that had been 
accumulating throughout centuries. It did not satisfy, even with 
this relative improvement. The workers still were not satisfied and, 
7 
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as I said before, the fact that there was an improvement made them 
impatient for more improvements. The fact that the peasants now 
could get some land, made their desire stronger for the rest of the 
land .. The same situation prevailed among the workers and that 
gave the radical socialist parties an opportunity to carry on 
propaganda among the peasants and the workers. There was con­
siderable response to this propaganda, although it was nothing 
overwhelming. 
Finally there was still what I would describe as the cul­
tural pressure. In spite of all the problems and impatience and the 
struggle against illiteracy, on the eve of the Revolution, sixty per­
cent of the population of the Russian empire were still illiterate. 
This, of course, was an appallingly high percentage. Incidentally, 
here I would like to tell you what I am telling all my audiences and 
all my students whenever I touch upon this particular point-and 
that is to warn you against the exaggerated notion (which you can 
still find in books on the subject, in public speeches and so on) 
that there were ninety percent illiterate in Russia on • the 
eve of the revolution. Some people up to this day still tell you that, 
Henry Wallace among them. He has made the statement many times. 
The figure is fantastic and has no foundation in fact ·whatsoever. 
Sixty percent is bad enough; why make it worse by making it 
ninety percent. The political consequences of that situ,ation are 
quite obvious. When you have sixty percent illiterates in a nation 
it is difficult to get real national unity, particularly in a time of 
crisis. There isn't enough mutual understanding. There isn't enough 
of a common language. That means that sixty percent of the Rus� 
sians really did not participate in what might be called the nation's 
cultural life and therefore could not develop, strictly speaking, na­
tional consciousness. It was this cultural gulf, this cultural rift, in 
Russia between the educated minority and the uneducated major­
ity which turned out to be one of the most dangerous things when the 
trial of revolution came. This lack of understanding led to mistrust 
8 
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by the popular masses of the white collar men whom they could 
not properly understand, even when these white collar men tried to 
work with them and professed to be quite sincerely their friends. 
However, with all these tensions, I am convinced that there 
was not what the Soviet writers would describe as an immediate 
revolutionary situation in Russia on the eve of the first world war. 
The revolution was a possibility, perhaps a probability, but there 
wasn't anything inevitable in it. I thought at the time, and I think 
the same• thing now on the basis of historical studies, that there 
were good chances for a gradual, peaceful solution of the country's 
pressing problems, that it was a question of time and above all it 
was a question of peaceful time. Peace was needed for that-no in­
volvement in major international conflicts. That was precisely 
what was not given to Russia by the course of historical events. 
From this point of view, I think the involvement of Russia in the 
first world war was a fatal thing for the Imperial regime. I don't 
think that any war is ever opportune from the point of view of any
country, but one might say, without exaggerating, that the war of 
1914 came to Russia at the most inopportune time possible because 
it caught the Russian government and the whole country, in the 
process of reorganization. A very wise French political scientist, 
Tocqueville, once said in the middle of the 19th century, "The most 
dangerous time for a bad government is when it begins to reform". 
There is a good deal to that because they lose their old stability 
of habitual wickedness, and they are not yet sufficiently good to 
. be stable again. They are just in a transition period. That is exactly 
what happened to the Russian Imperial regime. 
The war stopped this progress in its initial stages. Every­
thing was being reorganized, changed, adjusted to modern con­
ditions and right at this moment came the terrific shock of a 
modern war, the magnitude of which nobody anticipated at the 
time. The duration of the conflict and the magnitude of it came 
9.
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very much as a surprise to the majority of the people in the 
period. Also of course, the war inevitably intensified all the 
tensions-the political tensions, the social tensions, the economic 
tensions, the cultural tensions, and it fatally undermined the 
prestige of the government. 
What, in my interpretation, ultimately brought about the 
downfall of the Imperial government was primarily the loss of 
political unity in the country due to the political crisis and the loss 
of national morale. A great deal has been said of Russia's unpre­
paredness in the first world war and of the series of def eats suf­
fered by the Russian army during that war. My impression· is 
that the importance of this factor has been over-emphasized and ex­
aggerated. A sober study of the course of events in Russia shows 
that the military situation was not as desperate as it has been 
pictured. I am sure that a politically and morally healthy nation 
could have withstood these blows and survived until the end of the 
war. Some other writers emphasize the economic difficulties. They 
certainly were great, but to my way of thinking, they were not 
fatal. What made the military and economic difficulties fatal was 
the political crisis, which started in the midst of the war in the 
summer of 1913, and only abated with the collapse of the Imperial 
regime early in 1917. I believe that the responsibility should be 
divided between the government and the opposition, but the lion's 
share, in my opinion, still lies on the shoulders of the Tsarist gov­
ernment which had behaved in an almost suicidal manner. Instead of 
trying to placate their opposition and preserve national unity by 
timely concessions, they behaved in a way which finally antagonized 
everyone, so that when the crisis came, the government really had no 
active def enders. 
This was the background for the first revolution of 1917. 
One must remember that in 1917, not one, but two revolutions took 
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regime. The second one was the advent to power of the Communist 
party. It was not called the Communist party at the time; it was 
ref erred to usually as the Bolsheviks. The first one of these was 
the March revolution of 1917. Perhaps a note is in order here. 
Very often you will find it in books called the "February Revolu­
tion." It happened in February-the last days of February by the 
calendar then in existence in Russia. This was the old Julian calen­
dar which in the twentieth century was thirteen days behind the 
Gregorian calendar. The same was true later with the Bolshevik 
revolution. The October revolution happened early in November 
which creates a minor confusion on the subject; but February 
means March, and October means November as far as these 
revolutions are concerned. 
This March revolution is a classic example of an unpre­
pared and not planned for revolution, a revolution which one might 
say "just happened." I was in Russia at the time--not only in 
Russia but in St. Petersburg where the revolution actually took 
place and I still remember this very strange psychological phen­
omena. For a fairly long time before that, everybody would talk 
about the impending revolution. Everybody would exclaim on oc­
casion, "Well things cannot go on like that any longer, it certain­
ly will end in a revolution." So you might say that all anticipated 
it and yet when it actually came, nobody recognized it at first and· 
all were taken by surprise. The government was taken by sur­
prise because it did not prepare any adequate measures of de­
fense. The moderates were taken by surprise, as you shall see in a 
moment, and the revolutionary parties were taken by surprise. 
They did not organize this revolution, they did not plan for it. It 
did not happen as they anticipated it would happen, and they only 
tried to use it later when it was already an accomplished fact. It 
was a very spontaneous and in a sense an accidental thing. 
It all started with food riots in St. Petersburg, which were 
11 
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caused by temporary difficulties in food supplies. St. Petersburg was 
situated in a very bad part of the country for a capital. Nothing, 
or almost nothing, grew around it; everything had to be brought in, 
sometimes from a long distance. Therefore, difficulties with the 
railroad traffic were felt immediately in the supplies of this capital 
city which was over-crowded during the war anyhow. As a result 
of these difficulties a group of people started to protest and they 
were in their full rights; I've seen some of them myself. This was 
not a pleasant occurrence but it did not look like a revolution that 
would overthrow the Tsarist government when it started. It all 
. continued about a week, and from one day to another. these dis­
turbances became more and more serious. Then as a last resort the 
authorities on the spot called out the troops. The troops refused 
to do anything about it and instead . of dispersing the crowds, 
, began to fraternize with them and finally went over to the side 
of the people. That really decided the issue. 
These troops were the troops of the St. Petersburg garri­
son; not regular troops, but rather raw recruits. In Russia they 
were called, "Reserve Battalions." They were kept there waiting 
for their turn to be sent to the front to replace the losses at the 
front. Discipline among them was low. And it was this military 
force on the spot which really decided the issue by leaving the au­
thorities within the capital without any armed force whatsoever 
at the decisive moment. And it was in this way that the revolution 
happened. There were no barricades. There was nothing, that we 
usually associate with the classical type of revolution. 
Let me tell you one thing which I think is rather illuminat­
ing from this point of view. I was connected at the time with the 
War Department. On the day, which is now recorded in all the 
history text books as the day of the fall of the Imperial regime; 
I went to my office in the War Department as usual at about eight­
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body else did. We worked regularly as we did every day. During the 
day we began to hear that there was something happening in the 
other part of the city. Some crowds were moving, some soldiers 
moving, but nobody knew exactly what was happening. I went 
home without knowing anything about the historical event that 
was taking place. I tried to find out what was going on by tele­
phoning in the evening but the telephone was out of order and so 
I went to bed without knowing what was happening. The next 
morning when I awoke everything was over and I learned the news 
that the Imperial government was no longer there and that a new 
revolutionary regime had started. Now I am convinced that 
was the experience of nine-tenths of the population of the capital 
of the Russian Empire, not to speak of the people outside of St. 
Petersburg where actually nothing happened at all. This I think is 
a remarkable case of an unplanned, casual revolution. 
When that happened the Tsarist government on the spot 
(the Emperor himself was with the army) simply abdicated. From 
the moment they heard about the desertion of the soldiers, they 
became panic stricken and all resigned and disappeared. There was 
no authority left in the capital in the midst of a war, and it was 
then that the moderates in the Duma were forced to take upon 
themselves the exercise of supreme power. 
The Duma as I told you was based on a limited franchise. 
It represented mostly the property classes and some intellectuals. 
It consisted in an overwhelming majority of people of moderate 
views who didn't want to be revolutionists. They had to become 
revolutionaries in spite of themselves because there was no other 
way out of the situation. Here was a vacuum; it had to be filled. 
Everybody went to the Duma; the soldiers that revolted went 
there and said, "Here, we are at your disposal." And at first the 
Durn.a didn't know what to do with them. When they arrested 
the former ministers, they would bring them to the Duma and 
13 
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say "Here are these criminals; do something with them." And 
the Duma didn't know what to do with them. It was under such 
conditions that they assumed power. 
A committee of the Duma declared that, due to the 
anarchy in the capital, it took upon itself the functions of the 
government temporarily. Almost simultaneously another institu­
tion appeared and that was the Soviet. Soviet now is a household 
word throughout the world. Back in 1917 nobody outside of Russia 
knew what it meant. Originally it simply meant "council." 
Back in 1905, during the dress rehearsal revolution to which 
I referred before, a Soviet of worker's deputies was organized at 
the time of the general strike and at that time its purpose was to 
serve as a general staff for the strike. Nobody thought of making 
it a permanent institution-only a national strike committee. In 
1917 some of the Socialists remembered about that experience. 
"We had this Soviet back in 1905, why not create another one 
now?" But there was one substantial difference, and that was that 
at this time they added the soldiers to the workers because the 
soldiers played such a decisive part in overthrowing the Tsarist 
government by their desertion. It was felt that now they must 
have a Soviet of workers and soldiers. They did this in a very 
hasty fashion but there was no regular election. They just brought 
together a certain number of factory workers and a certain number 
of soldiers that they could find at different places, and declared 
this to be the Soviet of Soldier's and Worker's Deputies. This was, 
from the beginning, guided by socialists and by more radical mem­
bers of the opposition. The idea was that this would be an or­
ganized control over the Duma which of course represented the 
property classes and the moderates. 
On the basis of an agreement between a Duma committee 
and the Soviet, the first provisional government was born. This 
14 
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provisional government subsequently became known as the Ker­
ensky government. It was not a Kerensky government at first be­
cause, although Kerensky was in it, he was not the Prime Minister 
and was not the most influential member. He became Prime Minister 
later, several months later when the government was reorganized. 
This provisional government was a temporary government as the 
name "Provisional" indicates and its function was to bring the 
country to a constituent assembly which, elected by the people on 
the basis of universal franchise, was supposed to decide the future 
form of government in Russia. It was a kind of "caretaker" govern­
ment for the interim period. Paradoxically its first membership 
consisted almost entirely of moderates. There was only one socialist 
there and that was Kerensky, and he was a very very moderate 
socialist who was looked upon with suspicion by the real radical 
socialists. He was something like a labor man in England, much 
nearer Bevin or Atlee, than Lenin, Stalin or Trotsky or any of those 
men. 
Now why was this so? Why did it happen that the mod­
erates had to take power? Well, there were different reasons for 
that. but the principle one is the weakness of the revolutionary 
parties, including the Bolshevik party, at that moment. First of 
all, most of their leaders were abroad. Lenin was in Switzerland, 
Trotsky was in New York, Stalin was not abroad but in exile in 
Siberia and so were the majority of the revolutionary leaders at 
the moment when the revolution took place. Only second rate 
leaders were on the spot. But I think that even if all of the 
first rate leaders had been on the spot-people like Lenin, Stalin, 
Trotsky and the rest of them-they would not have dared to take 
power into their own hands at that time for the very simple reason 
that they were not nationally known. Do not forget that during the 
Imperial regime they were underground parties; they never ap­
peared in the limelight until the period of revolution and excite­
ment set in. Before that they acted as underground leaders and I 
don't think that more than a handful of people in early 1917 knew 
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the name of Lenin in Russia. That might surprise you, but I think 
it is a statement of fact. Therefore, a government consisting of 
nobodies, from the point of view of the country at large, would 
not command confidence and wouldn't make any appeal. By con­
trast, the Duma leaders, who were acting in the open · and who 
played a very important part during the w�r and whose names 
were known throughout the country and in the army, inspired 
confidence. The socialists and the radicals permitted the moderates 
to organize the government at first, because they themselves were 
not in a position 'to do so at that time. This provisional govern-
. ment, as I already said, was supposed to remain in power until the 
constitution of the constituent assembly. Before it could invoke 
the constituent assembly, it was overthrown by the second revolu­
tion. The second revolution brought Lenin and his Bolsheviks into 
power. The provisional government disappeared early in November 
of 1917, after eight months of unhappy and rather turbulent ex­
istence. 
I have no time for a detailed narrative of the events of 
these eight months. Instead of this, I will summarize the principle 
reasons for the ultimate failure of the provisional government and 
for the victory of the Bolsheviks headed by Lenin. First of all 
perhaps, one should remember what might be called the "usual" or 
the "general" course of revolutions on the basis of the few major 
revolutions in European history with which we are familiar. They 
all seem to follow the same course which in the earlier period of 
the revolution is more and· more to the left. Everywhere it begins 
with the moderates in control and in each case the radicals replace 
the moderates. I don't think there is anything mysterious about 
it. I think it can all be explained on psychological terms. Let us 
not forget that revolution is primarily a psychological phenomenon. 
It is something t�at happens in men's minds or in men's souls. As 
I see it, what happens is this: Once a revolution starts, all the usual 








nature of obedience, which is a very important thing in human 
society. It is the fact that somehow you have to obey the con­
stitutional authorities and you have to obey the law. Then all 
of a sudden a sufficiently large group of people don't feel this way 
any longer. On the contrary they feel that you can take law into your 
own hands, that you choose to obey or disobey the constitutional 
authorities. When such a situation arises, then naturally, with no 
restraints left, the revolutionary passion begins to run its course, 
and as long as there is enough of it, the tendency is to go to the 
extreme. The radicals benefit from this because they can ride on 
the sway of this passion much better than the moderates. So this, 
I think, happened in Russia too. But with this must be some more 
specific reasons, some Russian reasons; not general human reasons. 
First of all one must consider the whole background of the 
Russian. What the provisional government tried to do was to stop 
the revolution at a certain stage and to crystalize the situation in 
the forms of a traditional western European or an American 
democracy, which is traditionally a middle of the road policy. 
Democracy, after all, is the most difficult form of government. It 
is the one that requires the most intelligence and self restraint 
and self limitation. There was no training that could prepare the 
majority of the Russian.people for such an exercise of self-restraint 
because they had very little experience in their past history with 
self government, either on a local or a national scale. The constitu­
tional regime was ten years old when the revolution broke out. Ten 
years in the history of a nation is a very very brief period. Then 
of course there was also the lack of general education and the sixty 
. .
percent illiterates which I ref erred to. On top of that you had the 
specific war-time conditions. 
Another tremendously important fact which should not be 
forgotten, is the fact that the revolution in Russia took place in 
the midst of the war while the Germans and _their allies were still 
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in Russian territory. Because of this, a double task of almost 
super-human difficulty was put before the provisional government 
at the same time: reorganizing a country the size of Russia with 
its variety of races and nationalities and historical background 
into complete democratic society overnight while at the same time 
continuing to fight the war to a victorious conclusion. They re­
fused to conclude a separate peace or think about it. They were 
still loyal to their allies and to their military obligations. They in­
sisted that the war must go on. 
Now either of those two tasks separately would tax the 
ability and the energy of any country, even under normal conditions. 
Combined, they became almost super-human tasks. Then there were 
some weaknesses in the makeup of the government itself. First of 
all, it was a coalition government and became increasingly 
a coalition government. In the later period of these eight 
months there were socialists next to non-socialist liberals and so 
on, and they did not always agree. The government was under­
mined by the existence of a parallel authority, because the Soviet 
also claimed authority and very often issued orders which con­
flicted with the orders of the provisional government. 
The government a.lso had no means of repression in its 
hands. Now every government, no matter how democratic, needs 
some means of repression to put an end to disorder and open re­
bellion. Very few people realize that on the next day after the 
revolution, after the fall of the Russian Empire, there probably 
wasn't a single policeman left on his beat throughout the whole ex­
tent of the Russian Empire. The old police was associated with the 
old political regime to such an extent and was so unpopular with 
the people, that for their own safety and their self protection they 
discarded their uniforms, pretended they never had been police­
men and disappeared. Here was a new government without any 
police force whatsoever. They tried to improvise some sort of a 
volunteer militia but it was not very efficient. They had no reliable . 
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military force at their disposal oil the spot, because one of the 
conditions on which the provisional government was permitted to 
be organized by the Soviets (and they were forced to sign this) 
was that they would not remove from St. Petersburg the soldiers 
who took part in the overthrow of the Tsarist government. 
That, of course, put these soldiers in a privileged position in. 
a sort of praetorial guard, a revolutionary praeto�ial guard. They 
knew they could not be sent to the front and they could not be 
replaced by more reliable troops. It was this very unruly, very 
independent, military force that the government had at its im­
mediate disposal. When the provisional government fell, what hap­
pened was this: These very soldiers, who in March left the Tsar­
ist government and went over to the Duma, now left the Pro­
visional government and went over to Lenin and his crowd. Here 
again was the decisive military 'opportunity while there was no 
time and no opportunity to bring the troops from the front to 
put down the coup d'etat insurrection. 
Finally the democratic idealism and legalism of the pro­
visional government also had something to do with holding it 
down. Democratic idealism is a very fine thing, but democracy 
must know how to def end itself and this art they did not possess. 
Take the case of the constituent assembly for instance. They de­
cided they must first devise a purposeful electoral law on the basis 
of which this assembly could be elected. They were very honest, 
very idealistic people, so they convoked a committee consisting of 
the best specialists on constitutional law. For months and months 
this committee debated, article by article, the electoral procedure. 
I'm told by specialists (I'm not a specialist myself) that what they 
finally produced was the finest electoral law that had ever been 
devised by human minds. But the only trouble was that by that 
time the government itself was overthrown and they never 
could make use of this law. Now obviously, it would have been 
better to convoke the assembly as soon as possible on the basis 
of an imperfect electoral law but have some sort of popular back-
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ing behind their authority, or even to turn over that authority to 
a permanent government. This was a typical mistake that was made; 
Against this you have Lenin, the leader of the Bolsheviks, 
with his strategy and his tactics. He returned to Russia in April 
1917 from Switzerland, after having traveled through Germany 
with the permission of the German military authorities, with a 
very definite scheme in his mind. By this time he came to the con­
clusion that the time had arrived for a universal all out Communist 
Russian revolution. He didn't call himself Communist as yet. Ac­
cording to his theory, which is undoubtedly familiar to you, capital­
ism had come into its last phase, the phase of imperialism, and 
was doomed to an early destruction. War was an opportunity, an 
introduction to social liberty. Therefore his task was to transform 
the war that was going on into a social revolution, not only in 
Europe but everywhere. The fall of Tsarism in Russia gave him 
a wonderful opportunity. Re decided to make Russia a starting 
point for a world revolution. In order to do that, he had to get rid 
of the provisional government and of the moderate socialists who 
did not agree with his scheme and with his problem. He had en­
gaged, since his appearance in Russia, a tremendously well organ­
ized, and largely effective, propa�anda campaign directed towards 
these aims-the undermining of the authority of the provisional 
government and winning over popular support. It is important to 
remember that during these summer months of 1917 Communism, 
as such, was not an issue. Lenin never advanced any of the specific 
proposals that we now associate with the Communist regime in 
Russia. Nobody in Russia in 1917 heard of collective farms or five 
year plans or any of these specific features of the present day 
Communist regime in Russia. He addressed himself to the more 
immediate needs and aspirations, and offered very simple slogans. 
People were tired of war so he insisted on immediate peace at any 
price. Russian peasants had always wanted land, so he insisted on 
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the immediate seizure of land by the peasants and so on. That put 
the provisional government in a very disadvantageous position. 
Take these two crucial issues, the war and land questions. 
On the question of war the provisional government said, "Yes, we 
too want peace but we want a general democratic peace in alliance 
with our western allies. We are negotiating about the conditions, 
about the terms of such peace but meanwhile wait and continue 
to fight." Lenin came and said, "Well, if these western allies, these 
western capitalists want to fight, 'it's their business. Why should 
the Russian soldier shed his blood for western capitalists. Let's 
start fraternizing with the enemy and conclude peace at any price 
and as soon as possible." A similar situation existed with regard to 
the land question. No one in· Russia, at the time, objected to the 
transfer of land to the peasants. It was so obvious that it had to 
be done that even the landlords were resigned. But the provisional 
government's condition was "This is a complicated economical 
question and it cannot be done in a haphazard economical fashion. 
So we will appoint a committee, this committee will prepare a bill, 
this bill will be admitted to the constituent assembly and the con­
stituent assembly will pass a law. Then, legally and in an orderly 
fashion, you will get your piece of land." As opposed to that was 
Lenin's propaganda "Don't wait for any constituent assembly; you 
have the right to this land. Go in and seize it and divide it among 
. yourselves as you see fit." Now you can easily see how in this situa­
tion it was rather difficult to combat this sort of propaganda. The 
amazing thing about this is that it did not win enough support 
until the very last moment. 
Throughout most of this period the Russian people exhibited 
remarkable resistence to Bolshevik propaganda. It was only late in 
September that the Bolsheviks got a majority in the Soviet. As to 
the country at large, they had no majority (I'll tell you in a moment 
why I think so) even at the time when they actually seized power. 
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The power was seized not so much by a popular uprising or a 
popular revolution as by means of, what I would call, a coup d'etat. 
In contrast to the March revolution, the November revolution of 
1917 was carefully planned, carefully prepared, and carefully or­
ganized by the Bolshevik party led by Lenin. It was really a coup 
d'etat .effected by a small group of professional revolutionaries. 
The actual events again were limited to St. Petersburg, not the 
co1,mtry at large, and the number of participants was very small. 
Again there were no large scale battles; there was no popular up­
rising in the actual sense of the word. What happened was that a 
group of people under the leadership of· Lenin and Trotsky seized 
. 
' 
all the strategical positions in the capital at a designated time and, 
as the Provisional government did not have sufficient military force· 
on the spot to forestall it, they were forced to capitulate. Then the 
rest of the country simply accepted the change, some perhaps 
with enthusiasm, but I am sure these were in the minority. The ma­
jority took it with a spirit of passive resignation. There wasn't any­
thing to be done about it. "This new government is there, let's see 
what it is going to do." 
The reason why I insist that, at that moment, they did not 
have a majority of the people behind them is very simple. A few 
weeks after this coup d'etat, that is, after the new Soviet govern­
ment headed by Lenin and his Bolsheviks was already established, 
they permitted the scheduled elections to the constituent assembly 
to take place. These elections were, and still are, the first and the 
only free democratic elections. that ever had been held in Russian 
history. They really were free elections ·and they really were 
democratic. The results were this: the Bolshevik party gained 
one thir.d of the votes, while two thirds went to the parties which 
they had overthrown. That happened several weeks after they had 
established their gov�rnment. 
When Lenin learned about these results he made a very 
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interesting comment, which can be found in his collective writings 
and which to me is very illuminating. He admitted the fact and he 
said, "Yes, our opponents have the majority, but see how the votes 
are distributed. We got the majority in the strategic points which 
really matter. The industrial workers, the large industrial cen­
ters voted for us, and so did the soldiers and the sailors in im­
portant strategic places. In other words, the vote was for us in. those 
groups which have real power in their hands. Our opponents have a 
majority, but this is the majority of peasants dispersed through­
out the country, not organized and therefore they really don't mat­
ter from the point of view of the struggle for power." This is a 
very familiar argument; that is, it has become familiar since. This 
is the way the Communists now argue in the satellite countries 
which are under Russian influence. They don't care about what they 
call electoral arithmetic. What they want is to seize strategic 
points. The background for that is already back there in Russia 
in 1917 in the Russian revolution. It proved to be a realistic cal­
culation, because it permitted them to establish their power even 
· in the face of the fact that two thirds voted against them. The
other parties won the votes but lost power. The Bolsheviks lost
the election but retained power and power in the mind of Lenin was
the important thing.
It seems to me that this explains a good deal in the sub'­
sequent course of events in Russia and in particular the nature of the 
Soviet government. You have here a case of a determined group of 
Bolsheviks which tried to impose on the country, using favorable 
circumstances of course, a blue print of their own political and 
social program at the moment when the country was not prepared 
for socialism either materially or spiritually. Because of this, be­
cause they had to act from that time on in hostile surround­
ings, this government could be only a dictatorial government. In the 
interest of self preservation, in the interest of perpetuating its pol-
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itical control, this government could not relinquish the dictatorial 
principle. It has to remain a dictatorship and today, more than 
thirty years after its coming into power, it is more centralized, more 
dictatorial and has a tighter control over the country than it had in 
the beginning. 
Then of course, the dictatorial nature of this government 
also shows in its foreign relations because they inevitably transfer 
into the field of international relations the experience they had 
inside their country: the fears, the suspicions, the spirit that has 
been generated by the struggle inside of the country goes into their 
relations with foreign powers. They cannot tolerate, as the example 
of Czechoslovakia has shown very well, even the semblance of a 
democratic government on their borders because in that they see a 
threat, not to the national interests of Russia which is a different 
proposition, but to the political interests of the regime. 
The historical background and the story of how this regime 
came into power helps us to understand the nature of the difficulties 
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The subject I am going to talk about today is a great mys­
tery to most people. Yet most people use credit and that is largely 
what I am going to deal with. It is very much as the colored boy 
down south viewed the problem of a mule that he had bought. He 
was bringing this mule home when he ran into a friend of his and 
the friend asked, "How much money did you pay for him?" He 
replied, "O, I didn't pay no money. I got him on credit. I gave my 
note." The other fellow said, "You sure got him cheap." Now 
thatis the problem that we have to keep in mind going through here. 
You can do wonders with credit if you don't overdo it. . You can 
stretch a thing just so far, and with credit you don't know how far 
you can stretch it until it is too late. 
This whole question of financing war, as it is done nowadays, 
is not fully understood. In bygone days it had to be done by inflating 
the currency, and before that by hoarding up treasure or hoarding 
up actual gold 'value of one sort or another. Nowadays we have a 
different system, and in some sense a much better system but, as 
I intimated a moment ago, it is a system that works so wonderfully 
that there is always the danger of saying, "Well, if we did two 
hundred fifty billion, why not do five hundred billion?'' After all, 
that is only another one hundred per cent. We went from fifty to 
two hundred and fifty, that's five hundred per cent so why not go 
'../) 
again and so on, and that's what we have got to watch. 
The actual cost of war cannot be put off, in an economic 
Professor Rodgers is Professor of Banking at New York Univer­
sity. He has written and lectured extensively on financial subjects and 
has held a number of positions in the field of business finance. 
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sense. You cannot postpone it; everyone suffers in time of war. 
. / 
The ships, the planes, the guns, everything that is destroyed has 
to be produced in time of war and it has to come out of the econ­
omy. Civilians have to do without things. These sacrifices cannot be 
postponed. Finance cannot shift the economic burden. It can, how­
ever, shift the burden as between classes of the population, so we 
start out here at the beginning with a very encouraging note for 
you professional gentlemen! 
No modern war has ever been lost_because of finance, that is, 
if you have a modern banking system, and we certainly have one 
in the United States. (Maybe it is a little too modern!) There is no 
excuse for losing a war because of the financial side. (We could go 
ahead and talk about how a modern. war involves mobilization of 
our resources and so on, but I don't think that is necessary for it 
must be an old story to you officers by now.) 
Now the first and simplest way to finance a war is by tax­
ation, and, by all means, it is the best. _Then there is no fooling 
around about it. You have the economic burden and the financial 
burden right at the same time. Prices don't get out of order, 
nothing gets out of line, and the purchasing power of the people 
does not increase. Everybody knows right where he stands. How­
ever, you can't do that in a democracy. You can't even do it in an 
autocracy, and certainly you couldn't do it in America. You have 
to hold a carrot out in front of the mule, as they say in England. 
You have to give the boys a little extra overtime pay. You have 
to give labor a little incentive to produce extraordinarily. Of course, 
patriotism is a great help, but something in the pay envelope also -
comes in handy! So we can't, especially in America, get away with 
financing a war by taxation no matter how sound it may be in 
theory. 
Now let us see why it is so sound in theory. You have no 
increase in the public debt. You don't have any back-log of pur-
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chasing power built up. You don't have the American people hold­
ing two hundred billion dollars of liquid assets and. no place to 
spend it-nothing to bu·y with it. Financing war by taxation would 
mean you wouldn't need the OP A; you wouldn't need price control. 
You wouldn't need such regimentation if you financed by taxation. 
As a matter of fact, gentlemen, if you financed by taxation, 
instead of war creating inflation, it would actually create deflation, 
becaus(;) you would not increase your purchasing power. Every in­
creased dollar would be taken right back by the government. You 
know, the Lord gives and the Lord takes, meaning the sovereign, so 
it will be taken right back. You hand it to the boys and you take 
it away from them Saturday night, or at least at the end of the 
month. But I say, you can't get away with it. The Congress wouldn't 
like it, the. voters wouldn't like it and, no nation, not even Stalin
with his Politburo can get away with financing a war in that 
fashion. 
Now the next best method is to borrow the amount that you 
do not raise by taxation. The question is who to borrow from. Well, 
obviously the best place to borrow is from the real investor, the 
fellow who has real capital, and from the earner by payroll de­
duction-that's the,real McCoy! Take back that purchasing pow­
er-that's the idea. Borrow from the investors, borrow from the 
insurance companies because they get premium income continually. 
They get real capital, the largest source of new real capital in this 
country. Their investment capital each year is the premiums that 
are paid in on the life insurance policies. It runs around three and 
one half to four billion dollars a year, and that means that some­
one has done without something. That means that people have paid 
that purchasing power to an insurance company instead of going 
out and buying the things they could have bought. There is no 
credit expansion there. As I said before, it is the real McCoy. It 
is simply a shifting of purchasing power from the man who has 
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the insurance policy to the insurance company, which in turn 
shifts it to the government through the purchase' of bonds. 
Now, the same thing is true of the payroll deduction plan. 
You gentlemen, who contributed so nobly by having bond deduc­
tions made from your pay, gave real purchasing power to the gov­
ernment. There was no indirection about that. There was no 
hocus-pocus; it was the real thing. If you had not done that, you 
could have gone out and spent the money for something. Don't 
worry, we won't go into the matter of what you might have spent 
it for, but you could have! 
We call that the ultimate investor where you just have a 
transfer of purchasing power and not a creation of new purchasing 
power; the ultimate investor, where people give up part of their 
own purchasing power and turn it over to the government, partly 
as a patriotic gesture and partly because they have coupons on that 
green paper that you get from the government and you get paid a 
little thing called interest ! 
Borrowing from ultimate investors really means from every 
source from which the government gets money, every source to 
which they sell bonds except the commercial banks and the Fed­
eral Reserve banks. Those two groups of institutions have what we 
call "credit expansion power." They can take what you might call 
nothing and make something out of it. They can give you a de­
posit on their books and you can go and buy things with it, and 
that goes for your Uncle Samuel, too. They can credit Uncle Sam 
on the books and Uncle Sam can buy things with it. As a mat­
ter of fact, that is the way the government does it. But please note: 
what I am saying does not go for the savings banks. In theory and in 
practice they are as far removed from the commercial banks as 
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Reserve Banks which have this expansion power. They can make an 
entry in an account on their books, called a deposit account, and 
then you draw chits on that-that is, pieces of paper called checks. 
And you can pay debts; you can buy things. You can make the 
wheels go around with that. 
Now you can't do it. If you set up an account and try it, you
go to jail, but the bank has a "system" and you pay interest for the 
use of the system and what ·you pay is very well worth it. Don't 
misunderstand me. Thi_s is another one of those instances where a 
little knowledge is a dangerous thing. I don't want you to get the 
idea that bankers sit down in a back room and through some hocus­
pocus eventually come up with something that was never seen on 
land or sea and shouldn't have been seen anyway! It is not like 
that at all. There is a system to it. Its creation is something that is 
real and substantial. If it is not done properly, the bubble bursts 
and every man for himself! 
So when you borrow from the ultimate investor it_ is very 
sound. However, you do put off the day of reckoning in one sense. 
It means that you have to pay the interest through an increase of 
the tax burden. It does effect the budget immediately where tax­
ation didn't. It means that government expenses go up; but it is 
not inflation. 
Our whole problem under this modern system of financing 
war is to prevent inflation. Inflation is the greatest economic and 
social curse known to man and I mean exactly that. It impoverishes 
the wrong people. It puts money in the hands of the wrong people. 
We can say that it is also the greatest curse of war because that 
is when you usually have your inflation-at least the most serious 
inflation, but not always. 
If you finance by selling these bonds to the ultimate in­
vestors, you create a cushion of purchasing power which can be 
29 
33
Naval War College: June 1949 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1949
RESTRICTED 
· used at the end of the war and thus help in the reconversion period.
It helps bridge the gap of greatly stimulated production for war
purposes over to the lower peacetime production. We got over it
better this time than we were entitled to. We did not have the eight
million unemployed as the bureaucrats insisted we were going to
have visited upon us. We did right well, thanks again to the miracle
of American industry.
I don't get paid a dime by the Association of Manufacturers 
for telling you that either. Another thing, I don't want you to mis­
understand my politics. I am not sent here by the Republican Na­
tional Committee. I was born in Kentucky, a Democrat, and they 
don't come any worse than that! 
In this country we didn't sell as many bonds to the ultimate 
investors as they did in Canada or as they did in Great Britain. 
We can't be too proud of ourselves about it. On the other hand, we 
did get away with it and we did win the war,�so let's not lament
too much about what they did in Canada and what they did in 
Britain. 
We now come to the sixty-four dollar question-borrow­
ing from the commercial banks. Here is where you are liable to 
be hit twice by that terrible two-edged sword of economics. In 
economics practically anything is liable to hit you going and coming, 
and it's bad when you get that. So, let's watch this very carefully. 
As a matter of fact, it wouldn't be necessary for me to come up 
here today if it was not to elucidate this point, and it is a point 
that isn't understood even by some barikers. They have a system, 
as I told you before, and· it is chiefly that system which I want 
to talk about to you today. 
When the government borrows from the banks it causes an 
increase in bank deposits and this is the way it is done. I want, 
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to give you the actual mechanics. A bank can buy a bond from the 
government in two ways. One is to hand a messenger some cash 
and say, "Take this cash over to the Federal Reserve and get us a 
bond." Gentlemen, that would be very crude. They have a much 
better arrangement than that. That's what we call exchanging· as­
s,ets-buying them for cash. Now any banker who did much of that 
would be out of the banking business before the messenger got back. 
It is like going home with the blue chips. It can't be done-not and 
keep the game going right! 
No, the way to do it is this: They send those dollars over to 
the Federal Reserve Bank for what the banker calls "reserves". 
The banker has to have a reserve over at the Federal, depending 
on whether it is a bank in New York City or Chicago. There, at the 
moment they have to have twenty-six per cent-in the war they 
had to have less-about twenty-two per cent. In the next group of 
banks, the next category of reserve cities, the banks have to have 
a lesser reserve, and then you come down to the country banks 
where they are permitted to have a still smaller reserve. During 
the war the banks had to have, at the Federal, about fifteen per 
cent of their deposits in their reserve balance. In other words, if a 
country bank had a hundred thousand dollars of deposits, they had 
to have a fifteen thousand dollar reserve account also. You may 
ask where did they get those deposits? In the next thing here, the 
hand is quicker than the eye-if I lose you here, you will be lost; 
you will be in the wilderness when I finish. First thing, you must 
think of these deposits as in a commercial bank account. When I 
say bank, I mean only commercial banks. You probably think that 
people come to the window and hand that pale, young man back of 
the wicket a dollar and say, "I want to deposit a buck before I 
spend it." No, that's not the way it is done. That's largely window 
dressing and not even very good window dressing. The dollar that is 
brought in over the window is put into the reserve deposit account 
31 
35
Naval War College: June 1949 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1949
RESTRICTED 
by the banker and he credits several times that amount to the ac­
count of some borrowing customer. 
Let us digress for an instance. You go to the bank and bor­
row a hundred thousand dollars. Happy thought ! What does the 
banker do? You sign a piece of paper called a note and he adds it 
to loans and discounts. That's the debit; that's on the left hand 
side of the balance sheet. The banker writes a hundred thousand 
dollars on the right hand side of an account called "John Q. Public 
-$100,000"; that's a deposit account. To the bankers that's a 
liability. To· you it is an asset, but to the bankers it is a 
liability-$100,000. Now where did that deposit come from? Did 
anybody sacrifice? Di.d anybody do without anything? They did not. 
The banker made a double entry. He had to enter on both sides of 
the books or they would send him to jail. Like the Navy, they have 
to balance things. When the banker increased loans and discounts 
he had to increase deposits-his liability. Now those deposits did 
not come from without the bank; they came from within the bank. 
One of the questions we frequently ask our doctoral candi­
dates-"Do deposits come from loans or loans come from de­
posits?" Some ninety-five per cent of them will answer that they 
come from deposits-that the banker lends out money that he has, 
which is not the case at all. The deposits come from the loans. If 
you have ever (and I hope you have not) sweated over a bank 
deposit ledger as I have, you would know that for every dollar that 
the teller sent up to you, the Loan and Discount and the Invest­
ment Departments send up tickets to credit accounts for ten or 
maybe even twelve dollars, and thus the deposits actually come from 
within the bank! 
This loan expansion you may call it, is really deposit
expansion power. In order to expand your deposits you have to 
have that reserve with the Federal-you must get it over there in 
some way. So whenever anyone brings a dollar in at the window 
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the banker sends that in to the Federal to his fifteen per cent re­
serve. Then he can buy five or six dollars worth of government 
bonds or make loans to an equivalent amount., 
We are going through it again now, using bonds. The way 
the banks buy bonds is by means of using an account that was 
started in World War I. The title of the account is "War Loan Ac­
count, Treasurer of the U. S." That was set up at the beginning of 
World War I, and has been going ever since, and if one of your 
shades should come back to referee a World War two hundred 
generations hence, you would probably find the same account right 
on the books ! 
Here is what happens. One day the banker gets a letter from 
the Fiscal Agent for the government saying, "The Treasury is of­
fering, as of such and such a date, fifteen billion dollars of which 
so many billion dollars will be eligible for bank purchase. We in­
vite you to subscribe up to a maximum of ----." They will 
give as a maximum a certain percentage of capital and surplus. 
Why do they put a maximum? Because 'the banks want more. So 
would you if you could write on both sides of an account and get 
one or two per cent! You wouldn't mind. You would want more. So 
they notify the Federal. And in due· time the banks are notified 
that as of a certain day they can make the entry, and as of that day 
what does each bank do? They make this entry I am talking to you 
about. Suppose a bank was told that they could have one hundred 
thousand dollars worth of· "Governments". As of the authorized 
day, they debit government investments, and credit "War Loan Ac­
count, Treasurer of the U. S."-$100,000. 
Now the government does not draw checks on commercial 
banks. The government used to do that fifty or sixty years ago, 
but charges of politics were made and presidents had trouble and 
things of that sort, so the government plays it safe now. As you 
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gentlemen know, they draw checks only on the Treasury but they 
are payable at the Federal so the government, by telegram, trans­
fers this balance in War Loan Account to the Federal, pays it 
out and it comes back to the commercial bank-but all of that has 
nothing to do with what I am explaining this morning. That's 
merely because of the auditing practices of the government. 
Eventually, the plane manufacturer or the munition manu­
facturer gets a check from the government on the government's 
account at the Federal. What does that munitions manufacturer 
do? He doesn't have an account at the Federal, but he does have 
an account at the State Street Trust Company or the Chase Na­
tional Bank, or some other good bank so he takes that check in 
to them. His account is credited, so the government's account­
the War Loan Account which went to the Federal-is debited 
and ends up in the account of the manufacturer at the commercial 
bank. In other words, all we have there is a transfer via the Fed­
eral, from the account of Uncle Sam to the account of "John Q. 
Public." That's the way it happens. They keep repeating that 
process over and over. 
Here is the thing to keep your eye on; watch the ball now! 
Each time the· government sells a billion dollars worth of bonds 
· to the banks in this way, it results first in an increase in War Loan
Account of a billion dollars and then,as the government sends the
money over to the Federal and it comes back, it results in an in­
crease of a billion dollars in the deposit accounts of the American
people--money which they can spend and buy things-ordinary
deposit accounts. It is just as good as if they had taken actual
money down and left it with the teller. It is just as good as if they
had borrowed it themselves. The only difference is that the gov-
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Now here is the ball I told you to watch-that expansion 
of deposits can then be used by the public, over, and over again, to 
buy more government bonds or to buy whoopee or anything the 
public wants to buy with it. It is their money. It has been trans­
ferred from the government's account to "John Q. Public". 
In sharp contrast, when a member of the public buys a gov­
ernment bond, all you have is a shift from one deposit account to 
another. He draws a check on his own account (That's the way 
you pay for it) and what does the government do with that check? 
The bank debits the deposit account of the bond purchaser so that 
his deposit goes down, and they credit the deposit account of Uncle 
Sam. This does not go into the War Loan Account. This is not 
credit expansion. This is a transfer of purchasing power. It is 
no increase-only a transfer and thus not inflationary. 
During the war our commercial banks reached a total in­
vestment of some eighty-eight billion dollars worth of government 
bonds. Thus the government borrowed more than �ighty billion 
dollars from the banks through this process which I have just 
described. Let us see what that means. It means that each time 
they borrowed, the total of deposit accounts, first, of the govern­
ment went up, and then later, of the American people. In plain 
English it means, at the moment, that the American people have 
sixty-three billion dollars of deposit accounts that they would not 
have had if the government had not sold sixty-three billion of 
bonds to the banks and if they had not held them. We thus have 
that purchasing power which would not have been in existence. 
You may ask how long it will be there.? The answer is: It will be
.·there as long as the bonds are on the asset side of the balance 
sheet! So long as the banks have sixty-three billion dollars worth 
of government bonds, they have to have sixty-three billion dollars 
worth of bank deposits. It may not be in the same bank; it may 
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move from bank to bank, but it has got to be in the system. It can't 
.. exist any place else. As you know, if you have the debit, you have 
to have the credit. 
It is very difficult for many to see the impact of this-to 
see its importance. Since the government began to borrow from the 
banks in 1934 there have been many wrong guesses as to how much 
can be borrowed in this way. I don't know what the upper limit is, 
as it is a case where "you furnish your music as you go along." 
Every time the deposits in the banks went up a billion dollars, a 
billion dollars was put in the hands of the people with which they 
could be patriotic and they, in the next bond drive, could give 
up a billion dollars in checks to the government. Their accounts 
would go down a billion and the government's account would go up a 
billion, and then what would the government do? It would spend a 
billion to pay for military services or supplies or whatever they 
spend the money for, and the deposit would then move out of the 
government account, back into the individual's account, over and 
· over again, until the end of time, or until those bonds come off the
asset side of the balance sheets of the banks. Gentlemen, don't
try to make something mysterious out of this or something dif­
ficult. It is the simplest thing in the world.
With all of this borrowing by the government and by busi­
ness, why are interest rates so low? Prices are higher than they 
were before the war; also there is more business activity than 
ever before. There is more demand for credit. Why then is money 
so very easy? The answer is simple: We have sixty three billion 
dollars of credit-sixty three billion dollars of purchasing power 
in the banks because of the method of financing the war through the 
banks. It is not folding money but it will do until the folding money 
comes along. It is sixty-three billion of purchasing power that is 
being used, over and over again, . week after week. This is the 
main answer as to why interest rates are so low. 
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There is one more thing I want to call to your attention. 
In America, we can borrow our reserves. Of course that is subject to 
the limitation of the total of gold. We have to have a certain 
amount of gold back of those reserve balances. But we have had, 
since World War I, which made us the unwilling recipient of the 
gold of the world, too much gold in this country. We have had no 
problem on gold back of our reserves. A lot of people, particularly 
professors, have been trying to make a problem of this, . but we 
really had no problem on it. We �an get the gold we want, any time 
we want, as long as we have the military power, the economic 
power, the industrial might. We can get gold; that is no problem 
at all. If, however, in time of war, our gold reserve (which was 
legally 25% during this war) falls below or shows that it is go., 
ing to fall below, all we need to do is reduce the reserve require­
ment and we will get away with it. We used to have thirty-five 
per cent of gold back of those deposits. We cut it to twenty-five 
per cent but nobody worried about it. 
During the war, the Federal held twenty-three billion dol­
lars worth of government bonds. How did the Federal get those 
bonds? They bought them by crediting the account of the govern­
ment. Thus to make it easier for the commercial banks to buy gov­
ernment bonds, the Federal Reserve Banks created twenty-three 
billion dollars of reserve, right on the barrel head. All during the 
war there was never any shortage of reserves. No bank had to send 
over any consequential amount of its government bonds to borrow to·
create its reserves; the government beat them to it. The Federal 
Reserve bought bonds and created the reserve account. On the 
basis of their reserve accounts the banks can create deposits. The 
member banks can then buy bonds and credit the government in the 
special deposit account called "War Loan Account", as explained 
before, and from there the purchasing power is transferred to the 
deposit accounts of the American people. 
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That is modern banking; that is the one thing that our com­
mercial· banking system does that no other part of our economic 
system can do. It is a remarkable service that they perform for us. 
It is really a wonderful thing. However, to make the system work we 
have to have public confidence and I am sure I do not have to tell 
you boys where yqu fit in that picture. As long as the public has
confidence in that system, there seems to be no limit to it. After 
the war we ran the debt up to 276 billion dollars. Unfortunately, 
it now appears.that there are some "boys" in Washington who think 
there is no limit. Now there is a limit even though we don't know 
exactly where it is. 
I want to conclude by saying that the role of finance has de­
clined in importance under modern warfare. To say this is probably 
unwise. As you know the customary thing to do is to tell you that 
finance is the most important thing in the world, and to listen very 
carefully or you are going to miss the boat and all that sort of thing. 
Well, that is a lot of nonsense. As I told you at the very beginning, 
you boys don't have to worry about it too much. I don't mean that 
you should go hay-wire or anything like that, but I do mean that 
with our modern banking system, the problem of financing war 
is greatly simplified. This was especially true during World War II. 
During the past war we did a much better job than -we did in 
· World War I.
The banks in this war did a good deal of financing for one­
third of one per cent per annum on Treasury bills. Now ponder 
that. If anyone tells you that the banks profiteered, remember, as 
bookkeeper.s they have to get something, and one-third of one per 
cent isn't much. They are entitled to something for working out 
such a system. They got eighty seven and one half pundredths of 
one per cent on Certificates of Indebtedness. In addition, the banks 
were able also, to buy long term bonds, on which they got less 
than two per cent, after taxes. All in all, they did a magnificent job. 
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So, in conclusion, I want to say that we financed this war 
very nicely, very neatly. There are lots of things that were done in 
Washington that I could criticize, but everything considered, the 
boys did a grand job. 
During the war, and since, they have done.a magnificent 
job of managing the public debt. We have a public debt now, as 
you know, of a quarter of a trillion dollars, and some people say 
the problem i.s whether we are going to pay it off, manage it, or 
repudiate it, or what not. Certainly we are not going to repudiate 
it, and in my humble opinion and within this room, there is no real 
need for us to pay it off. We will, of course, pay off some of it, but, 
as a matter of fact, I don't think the American people want it paid 
off. We are going to manage it, because if we don't manage it, 
gentlemen, it will manage us. The way the Federal Reserve author­
ities and the Treasury have fought inflation with one hand by 
raising the reserve requirements, raising interest rates, and with 
the other hand bought government securities and kept up the price 
· of government bonds until they finally passed the crucial test has
really been magnificent. When you can push up with one hand and
push down with the other and get away with it, you are pretty
darn good. As I said, they did that and I believe in giving credit
where credit is due. I had no hand in it; moreover I have never
gotten a dime from the Treasury or the monetary authorities for
defending them. I did get $15.60 a month in World War I from the
government as an enlisted man in the Navy. I earned it; the officers
saw to that. My conscience doesn't bother me one bit. So I want
to make it clear that I don't come here as an apologist for anything
that I had anything to do with and I don't come here to whitewash
anybody.
Clearly, the way we financed this war is the way we will 
finance the next one. I do hope we will finance more of the next 
39 
43
Naval War College: June 1949 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1949
RESTRICTED 
one by means of taxation although the. taxes were high enough in 
this one for me. When a college professor has to pay fifty cents out 
of an income dollar as income taxes, taxes are certainly high. None.,. 
theless, we do have to recognize that taxation right up to the 
breaking point, but not beyond it, is the soundest way to finance 
war; Any additional amounts needed can be supplied through 
credit expansion by our marvelous banking system. 
That concludes my story, and thank you very much for 
your close attention. 
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